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Hamlet plays with difference in comparing a hawk and a handsaw as if
they should be mentioned in the same breath and thought of in the same
comparison in a way that would make John Donne wonder whether his
metaphysical conceits, such as the lovers as a compass, had not gone far
enough. Some comparisons stretch the point because of their disparateness.
Others are based on more similarities. Making distinctions can be difficult,
as in the case of mythology and ideology. But there is a middle ground. Let
us take the comparison between music and poetry. The American composer,
Aaron Copeland, was pleased to be appointed the Charles Eliot Norton Pro-
fessor of Poetry at Harvard in 1951, but wondered in his lectures why he was
asked. As a young man, he had commiserated with poets because they “were
trying to make music with nothing but words at their command,” yet in
time he saw that behind the music of both arts they were joined in “an area
where the meanings behind the notes and the meaning beyond the words
spring from some common source” (Copeland 1). Copeland was poetic
about music just as Northrop Frye considered the music of poetry and even
of theory. The composer said: “The music of poetry must forever escape me,
no doubt, but the poetry of music is always with me” (2). Whereas the song
of literature preoccupied Frye, that of music was the concern of Copeland:
“It signifies that largest part of our emotive life –the part that sings. Purpose-
ful singing is what concerns most composers most of their lives” (2). In the
spirit of the times, Copeland also added:
The musical work must be reinterpreted, or better still, re-created in the mind of the
performer or group of performers. Finally the message, so to speak, reaches the ear of
the listener, who must then relive in his own mind the completed revelation of the
composer’s thought. (2)
This recreation and reliving is also something that R. G. Collingwood dis-
cussed in 1946 when looking at history as a re-enactment of past experience.RECEPCIÓN: MAYO 2007 RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54 ACEPTACIÓN DEFINITIVA: JUNIO 2007
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or indirect and that the historian, when trying to discover the past, looks at
relics that contain words and has to discover what the person who wrote
them meant: “To discover what this thought was, the historian must think it
again for himself ” (Collingwood 233, see 282). The historian is re-enacting
in his own mind the experience of the writer. Frye also gravitated to
moments of recognition or discovery and to recreation of literature in the
mind. Collingwood, Copeland and Frye also posed the question of identity
in difference, of the relation between interpretation and reinterpretation.
This interest in recreation and re-enactment in the interpreter might be
called the drama of meaning.
The question of interpretation and recognition relates to central concerns
in the work of Frye that touch on language, story and argument. In a num-
ber of my earlier works on Northrop Frye, I discussed the various relations
among myth, metaphor and ideology, but I will try to shape and reshape my
discussion in a new context (see Hart 1992, 1994).1 “Myth,” “mythos”
(“muthos”) and mythoi are terms that Northrop Frye used in the first decades
of his career. One of the cruxes over the term “myth “ is how it shifted from
the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries, from myth as fable, fiction and
invention to myth as understood in archaic societies, or, as Mircea Eliade
once said, myth as “true story” or one “that is a most precious possession
because it is sacred, exemplary, significant” (Eliade 1). Frye explored this
interface in myth. His influence was wide-spread, and one such well-known
effect on a student was Margaret Atwood’s transformation of Frye’s concern
with myth and Canadian literature and culture into her own interests, espe-
cially in Survival (see Howells 13).
1. Criticism and ideology in the “Anatomy”
Here, as one of Frye’s many former students, I shall concentrate most on
Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism (1957), as part of an appreciation after fifty years.
For all Frye’s later interest in the term “ideology,” he does not really address
the issue under this rubric in Anatomy. Mythology, whether in terms of
myth, mythos or mythical modes, was much more of a concern in this Frye’s
most renowned book.2 Frye saw in literature the home of displaced myth
and argued for the identity between mythology and literature, which repre-
sented the might have been of story against the actuality of what happened
that is the basis of history. Nevertheless, in the “Polemical Introduction” to
Anatomy, Frye does envision criticism as being founded on an inductiveRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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would avoid determinism in which Marxism, Thomism, liberal humanism,
neo-Classicism, Freudianism, Jungianism, or existentialism substitute “a crit-
ical attitude for criticism, all proposing, not to find a conceptual framework
for criticism within literature, but to attach criticism to one of a miscellany
of frameworks outside it” (Frye 1957: 6). In a view that probably swam
against the current of what proceeded and followed Frye, he set out what I
have called elsewhere a declaration of independence for literature and criti-
cism (critical theory). Another sentence encapsulated this point of view:
“Critical principles cannot be taken over ready-made from theology, philoso-
phy, politics, science, or any combination of these” (7). Frye argued against a
study of literature anchored in the world beyond it. He warned against cer-
tain dangers: “To subordinate criticism to an externally derived critical atti-
tude is to exaggerate the values in literature that can be related to an external
source, whatever it is” (7). Ideological criticism, or a historical approach that
comes from history rather than from the history of literature, would not be
of the type for which Frye was advocating. Disinterestedness, which Frye
admitted was difficult, is the best tact for the critic. Frye favoured an induc-
tive study of literature rather than a deductive method. He preferred that
criticism be an art and science the way history is. He saw evidence within lit-
erature as important and not a superimposed attitude on literature itself.
Frye proposed a systematic criticism that might also be called scientific (7-
10). Just as the physicist studies physics, which is based on but is distinct
from nature, the critic studies literature, which Frye differentiated from criti-
cism (11). Frye stated it clearly and elegantly: criticism “is to art what history
is to action and philosophy to wisdom” (12). He understood the undertow
carrying the literary scholar away from literature toward the events of history
or the ideas of philosophy, but if criticism were to become systematic in an
expanding framework, this undertow would disappear (12). This framing
would attempt to answer what literature is, to distinguish between rhythm in
verse and prose, to develop a theory of genres, in short a theory of criticism
or poetics (13-14). Frye proposed criticism as a science (15-16). For Frye,
criticism must be involved in a recognition that it is “a totally intelligible
body of knowledge” (16). Unabashedly, Frye advocated for literary master-
pieces as the object of study for criticism, and that literature so constituted is
an inexhaustible order of words for that study (17). Meaningless criticism
was, for Frye, anything that would not build up this systematic criticism:
“This includes all the sonorous nonsense that we so often find in critical gen-
eralities, reflective comments, ideological perorations, and other conse-RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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of taste was not part of the structure of Frye’s criticism (18).
Northrop Frye built on T. S. Eliot’s view that the monuments of literature
make up an ideal order and are not simply individual works (18). Frye is not
fond of the praise for Middleton Murray for taking a “position,” a term that
is de rigueur in ideological criticism and theory, because sciences are not about
taking a stand or displaying one’s prejudices and errors but being open to the
evidence, to learning (19). For Frye, while the sociologist and literary scholar
can focus on literature, neither has to pay attention to the other’s methods.
The same would be true for a poet or theologian examining a religious poem:
they might come to very different conclusions about it. So while, for Frye, if
critics need to learn about sociology or theology, that is good, but they do not
need, not should, use sociological or theological methods to write criticism
(19). In discussing the theory and practice of literature, Frye made a distinc-
tion between the producer and practitioner of literature and between the the-
orist and consumer of literature even if these functions exist in the same per-
son. Frye saw literature as a liberal and humanistic pursuit, which, contrary to
the views of some others, meant that it avoided value-judgements (20). Plac-
ing judgement and position over values, which came to be basics of ideologi-
cal criticism and theory, was apt to warp knowledge of literature in the theory
of literature than to advance its systematic consolidation and advancement.
At the time Frye was writing, he saw value-judgements as being divided into
two types –comparative and positive. The comparative subdivided into bio-
graphical criticism and tropical criticism, which are rhetorical forms, the one
focusing on persuasion and the other on verbal ornament (20-21). In Frye’s
view, as poetics were at that time underdeveloped, rhetoric was illegitimately
extended into the theory of literature. Rhetorical value-judgements, accord-
ing to Frye, expressed social values and so the ranking of poets reinforced
social preference and moral metaphor (21). Value-judgements thus displace
critical experience. Matthew Arnold’s preference for epic and tragedy as
expressions of class was an example Frye chose to illustrate this rhetorical-
social, what we might call ideological, force against criticism. Arnold would
rank poets and would like poetry to take over values from religion, something
that was natural at a time when there was a “power vacuum in criticism” (22).
This led Frye to what would be an alternative.
Frye proposed a systematic study of literature that alternated “between
inductive experience and deductive principles” (22). Even though Frye was
not using the word “ideological” much at this time, his description laid the
groundwork for his later work in which he explained ideology as it related to
mythology:RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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of criticism, should be the deductive counterpart. There being no poetics, the critic is
thrown back on prejudice derived from his existence as a social being. For prejudice is
simply inadequate deduction, as a prejudice in the mind can never be anything but a
major premise which is mostly submerged, like an iceberg. (22)
Frye was sympathetic to the role of prejudice, as something submerged that
fills the void in a context that has not developed poetics systematically rather
than relying on poetics as the ancient Greeks knew them. He admitted that
is harder to see new prejudices compared to old ones. The shortcomings of
Arnold were more apparent than those of Frye’s contemporaries. Frye saw
that decorum connected the high, middle and low styles with social class
when literary criticism needed to look at works from the vantage of a class-
less society, something that Arnold himself considered necessary (22-3).
Ranking writers, whether based on conservative, Romantic or radical points
of view that read genre in terms of social, moral or intellectual analogy, was
not, for Frye, the true business of criticism (23). Positions provided for a par-
tial view. In less flattering terms, Frye called this kind of creation of selective
tradition “an anxiety neurosis prompted by a moral censor” that is “totally
devoid of content” (24). In this way, social dialectics became false rhetoric.
In a systematic criticism, Frye envisioned a biographical historic critic who
would read everything in the field without hero worship and a historical
critic who would read cultural phenomena “in their own context without
contemplation of their contemporary application” (24). Frye suggested ethi-
cal criticism as opposed to prejudice: “it deals with art as a communication
from the past to the present, and is based on the conception of the total and
simultaneous possession of past culture” (24). Historical criticism would pre-
vent the translation of cultural phenomena in contemporary terms, but ethi-
cal criticism is a counterweight that expresses “the contemporary impact of
all art, without selecting a tradition” (25). Frye’s scientific criticism argued
for a learning that fertilized life, “in which the systematic progress of scholar-
ship flows into the systematic progress of taste and understanding” (25).
Progress and totality have generally been two bugbears to postmodern and
post-structuralist theories, so that Frye’s displacement from their discussions
in time might partly be to do with an attempt to keep politics, opinion and
ideology from the science of criticism. Frye used Marx’s classless society, close
reading and historical criticism differently than many of his predecessors,
contemporaries and successors. It will become obvious in a systematic criti-
cism that some writers bear more study than others, but belabouring that
point is, for Frye, a waste of time and elaborating the obvious. Ethics and
aesthetics are not a codification of what is good according to one’s own tasteRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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current prejudices and the wariness they need to have about what they can-
not see: “Honest critics are continually finding blind spots in their taste: they
discover the possibility of recognizing a valid form of poetic experience with-
out being able to realize it for themselves” (27; see de Man 1971). The lan-
guage of anagnorisis or recognition is important to Frye’s criticism (see Hart
2006). Experiencing literature directly is not the lot of critics any more than
a direct experience of nature is that of physicists. Both nature and literature
need to be interpreted indirectly. In Frye’s view, reading literature occurs in
the presence of literature and not in criticism. So both are related but sepa-
rate and should keep their integrity. Frye admitted to subjectivity, but critics
look for interconnections among works, so that as readers they may know
that the text that is the object of their study is third-rate, but that it is signifi-
cant because of its importance in relation to something else in literature.
Frye’s language was sometimes religious with terms like “presence” and “reve-
lation,” but he also admitted that he would like to move forward and asked
the reader’s forgiveness of his own inadequacies because it is important to
move forward in this direction towards a systematic criticism (29). Frye also
apologized for his polemics and deductive method in terms of his book’s
principles having exceptions, but he thought he had to take this way because
of the limits of a book with an aim of such scope. Frye still insisted on the
schematic nature of his study and argued for classification in criticism and
schematization in poetics, which was important because the latter is not the
same as a “direct experience of literature, where every act is unique, and clas-
sification has no place” (29). Frye hoped that his scaffolding would “be
knocked away when the building is in better shape” and added that the rest
of his book “belongs to the systematic study of the formal causes of art” (29).
In the last sentence of the polemical introduction to Anatomy, Frye alluded
to Aristotle as he departed from him.
So what conclusions did Frye reach? In his “Tentative Conclusion,”
which is appropriate for a book of “essays” or tries, he tried to place various
types of critics of his time into the context of “a comprehensive view of criti-
cism” (341). What Frye hoped to achieve was “a new perspective” on the
existing programmes of critics of his time, and he wanted to break down bar-
riers between the different methods of criticism (341). In so doing, Frye
wished to keep critics from being caught in one method in which they
would look outside of criticism to have contacts with other subjects. Criti-
cism should not be bad comparative religion, semantics or metaphysics, and
Frye wanted to use archetypal criticism as a means to lead to dialogue
between critical methods. Why myth? It was because myth as mythos was “aRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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maintained, to be confused with allegorical criticism (which is found in
commentary) because archetypal criticism (which supplements allegorical
criticism) begins in the text to be studied and ends with “the structure of lit-
erature as a total form” (342). Frye suggested that by seeing that Virgil and
Isaiah employed the same kind of imagery to treat the myth of the birth of
the hero, it explains why the Nativity Ode was able to use both and thus
bring together the connections in scholarship rather than nodes around each
figure or poem. Paradoxically, Frye foresaw that breaking down barriers
within criticism would in the long-term make “critics more aware of the
external relations of criticism as a whole with other disciplines” (342). Frye’s
discussion of the progression of modes in his first essay in Anatomy involved
analogies of aging or maturation in cultural history. That being said, Frye
did not want to see this analogy dressed up in a metaphysics that would be a
perversion into a foundation for rhetorical value-judgements or some mud-
dle “quasi-organic theory of history” (344, see 343). Art does not, according
to Frye, progress and may not improve the artist, but it benefits the readers
by humanizing them. A great revolution has occurred since the printing
press but also in subsequent technical innovations in the technical ability to
study the arts (344). It is difficult to get to the original intention and it
would reduce the work if it were stripped to that. Whatever the original
intention of the producer of a work in the context of the social function of
his or her time, it is the function of the object, that it exists for our pleasure
now, that makes it art (344-45). For Frye, the critic recreates the function in
a new context.
Frye, as I have also argued elsewhere, is a visionary critic (Hart 1992,
1994). This can be seen in his metaphors as he wrote. His imagery is like
Shakespeare’s Richard II’s in prison. The substance of the shadows in Plato’s
cave is in ourselves, “and the goal of historical criticism, as our metaphors
about it often indicate, is a kind of self-resurrection, the vision of a valley of
dry bones that takes on the flesh and blood of our own vision” (345). This
again is a secular displacement of a religious experience. Vision and recogni-
tion are connected in Frye. It is not only characters who experience anagnori-
sis or its comic equivalent –cognitio– but also is an experience that historical
criticism produces:
The culture of the past is not only the memory of mankind, but our own buried life,
and study of it leads to a recognition scene, a discovery in which we see, not our past
lives, but the total cultural form of our present life. It is not only the poet but his
reader who is subject to the obligation to “make it new.” (346)RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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future. The recognition is also that historical and ethical criticism both need
correction or culture gets stuck in the past or is projected into the future,
and they become forms of selective indoctrination (346; see Cave; Hart
2006). Frye picked up on Arnold’s critique of class in which social energy
perverts culture to ostentation (upper class), vulgarity (middle class) and
squalour (lower class) and maintained that revolution leads to a dictatorship
of one class or another (347). Instead, Frye preferred Arnold’s axiom that
“culture seeks to do away with classes” (347), something he mentioned in the
polemical introduction. A liberal education is concerned with imagination in
which the ideals exist for a free, classless and urbane society that lifts people
clear of the bondage of history (347). According to Frye, “liberal education
liberates the works of culture themselves as well as the minds they educate”
(347-48). Frye’s vision of the work of art was not simply its beauty in and of
itself but also as it participates “in the vision of the goal of social effort, the
idea of complete and classless civilization” (348). Paradox defined Frye’s
notion of culture. For him, “Culture is a present social ideal which we edu-
cate and free ourselves by trying to attain, and never attain” (348). This is
what I have called the asymptotal aspect of meaning in which the writer’s
text and the reader through time may approach the threshold of insight or
understanding but can never quite reach it. 
Frye’s ethical criticism combined vision and distance. He appealed to theo-
ria, as detached vision, in the context of intellectual freedom arising from
transvaluation as opposed to being captive to social values arising from preju-
dice, habit and indoctrination (348). “The goal of ethical criticism,” in Frye’s
view, “is transvaluation, the ability to look at contemporary social values with
the detachment of one who is able to compare them in some degree with the
infinite vision of possibilities presented by culture” (348). Here, Frye seems to
combine William Blake’s vision of the infinite man with Arnold’s ideas on
culture in order to create something innovative. Although John Milton and
John Stuart Mill differ on liberty, the one seeing it as potential prophecy, the
other as social critique, they both stress “that liberty can begin only with an
immediate and present guarantee of the autonomy of culture” (348-49).
Frye’s Anatomy argued for that autonomy for literature and criticism from
other disciplines but also from each other even if they are related.
Frye also came to argue for what he considered to be a principle of
humanism “that the freedom of man is inseparably bound up with his accep-
tance of his cultural heritage” (349). He also reminded the reader that in the
second essay he had argued that moving from the individual work of art to
the total form of art, the art becomes an ethical instrument that participatesRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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Poetry is an established pattern of words that may remain more or less
unchanged but whose interpretation and reinterpretation, through criticism,
change according to history (349). Frye never settled on purity and separa-
tion, so, like the New Critics before him and the deconstructionists after-
ward, he saw the rhetorical nature of all language. He said that his last essay
in Anatomy argued for “the principle that all structures of words are partly
rhetorical, and hence literary, and that the notion of a scientific or philo-
sophical verbal structure free of rhetorical elements is an illusion” (350). Sur-
prisingly, for Frye, who championed the independence of literature and criti-
cism, he appealed to a larger context. If we are to accept this argument on
the structure of words, “then our literary universe has expanded into a verbal
universe, and no aesthetic principle of self-containment will work” (350).
Like mathematics, literature has pure and applied manifestations and both
proceed “by hypothetical possibilities” (351). And literature is not alone in
this. This connection might well be seen in Leibnitz’s possible world theory,
which is used in game theory, mathematics, philosophy and literary theory
(see Hart 1988, 2006). Later Frye would recreate a similar point to include
music. As Frye said in The Educated Imagination (1963), mathematics “is
really one of the languages of the imagination, along with literature and
music” (Frye 1963: 6).
Frye asked whether literature like mathematics is substantively and not
simply incidentally useful (Frye 1957: 352). Although in discussing the con-
structive and descriptive aspect of discursive verbal structures, that is form
and content, Frye returned to discovery and recognition, he did not go as far
as some deconstructive views in arguing that theology, metaphysics, law and
the social sciences are based on myth and metaphor only. Frye did, however,
allow that such poetic myths were important to constructs like those in the-
ology, science and metaphysics (353). Plato, according to Frye, saw the rela-
tion of myth to argument and saw apprehension in terms of mathematics
and myth (354). Frye continued with his own connecting of mathematics
and poetry: “Literature, like mathematics, is a language, and a language in
itself represents no truth, though it may provide the means for expressing
any number of them” (354). These two languages are different ways to con-
ceive of the universe. All verbal constructs, Frye argued, whether literature,
law or metaphysics, show their mythical and metaphorical outlines the fur-
ther we push them (354). For Frye, the work of the critic is to reforge “the
broken links between creation and knowledge, art and science, myth and
concept” (354). Frye spoke a critical and theoretical language without which
it would be difficult to imagine the North American reception of structural-RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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cal developments since the appearance of Anatomy. Still, in Paul Ricoeur’s
view during the 1980s, Frye’s typology in Anatomy did not have “any
recourse to the structuralists’ narratological rationality” and his order of para-
digms had an interesting relation to history: “Neither ahistorical not histori-
cal, it is rather transhistorical, in the sense that it traverses history in a cumu-
lative and not simply an additive mode” (Ricoeur 2, 13). In the early 1990s,
Julia Kristeva saw that Anatomy provided critical approaches that decompart-
mentalized “the technical enclosures” that contemporary theory delights in
and aspired “to a capable interdisciplinarity” while she agreed with Frye’s
suggestion in The Critical Path (1971) “that we centre the educational pro-
gram in this communal mythology that we have inherited from the Bible,
from the Greeks and Romans” (Kristeva 336). The reception of Frye could
be mixed, as in a book on postmodernism that focuses on myth and truth in
literature by Colin Falck, because there is, as Frye himself realized in Anat-
omy, a tension between the understanding of individual poems and the
schemes of literary theory like that of Frye (Falck 88-90, see 24, 60, 152).
Frye himself had to respond not just to this his most influential work –Anat-
omy– but to those who came after it and who, even without being aware or
admitting it, were indebted to him. A dialogue between mythology and ide-
ology ensued in this context.
2. Mythology and ideology beyond the “Anatomy”
What is the difference between story and argument? Perhaps there is only
story-argument at the end of the day (see Hart 1991). In discussing these
matters, I will use Northrop Frye, one of my teachers, as a guide to mythol-
ogy and ideology. Without him, I would not have made this distinction this
way. At the end of this essay, I will add more of my own variations on this
theme. Whereas Marxists and others since the 1960s often saw that content
was the key to literature, as if it were an argument or a key to the workings of
society, class, gender and other pressing issues, Frye observed a play between
genre and theme, so much so that if anything the form affected the content.
A story told or showed in one genre would not be the same as it would be in
another genre.
Frye recognized the debased form of myth as misconception and delu-
sion. He also realized its structural, narrative, cognitive, existential, and
social dimensions. As Frye’s critical theory made language to be of primary
importance, myth and metaphor, which in our context are made of words,RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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culture. Particularly, in the last decade of his life, Frye, who died in January
1991, often discussed mythology in relation to ideology. He considered ide-
ology to be a crucial subject. Frye saw mythology as being basic to it.3 For
Frye, myth was expressed through the imaginative and hypothetical nature
of literature. He viewed mythology as something more fundamental than
ideology but more marginalized and vulnerable. In Frye’s paradox, mythol-
ogy, when translated in literature and explained in criticism, might resist the
power of dominant ideologies and the political pressures on writers, scholars,
and critics. For some time now, I have argued that myth was Frye’s hope
against the desolate record of human history and especially tyranny. Myth in
literature was, for Frye, the rising up of the proletariat into a classless society
and the return of the repressed in a vision of hope and regeneration. This is a
social function of literature that creates a human community that cares for
the basic needs of its members. The desire to live, eat, love, create, and move
about freely is, as Frye argued, basic to members of a society. George Steiner
captured the ideological bind succinctly: “Ideologies and the mutual hatreds
they generate are territories of the mind” (Steiner 1998: 61). These are vir-
tual territorial wars with the dire consequences of conflict over actual turf,
the kind Hamlet gleans in Act IV, scene four from the Norwegian captain in
that play seemed to scorn when speaking about the wars as gaining “a little
patch of ground” and which Hamlet sees as finding “quarrel in a straw/
When honour’s at the stake.” Frye sought to fight against ideological con-
flicts by seeking something more basic that could attend to people’s needs
and bring them together. This is the social dimension of Frye’s view of meta-
phor and myth.
2.1. Frye is part of a European tradition that has defended literature against
the attacks on fiction that Plato, the Church Fathers and their successors
helped to sustain. Poetry and the theatre were particularly vulnerable to this
criticism (see Barish). This attack on the making or representation of fic-
tions, considered literature to lack moral or philosophical seriousness, to be
demonic deceitful, seductive and parodic. Literature is vulnerable in society.
Frye defended its dignity, autonomy, and significance in the face of the polit-
ical, social, ethical and semantic systems that humans make. Literature needs
defending because of human ignorance and ideology. It is worth defending
because the literary offers us means to regenerate ourselves and our society.
Frye’s work is a visionary alternative to ideological attacks on literature. 
Frye thought that ideology pervades society and influences and affects lit-
erature. He was sceptical about the manipulation of meaning as an ideologi-RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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ideological policing of the state and its special interests. He considered lan-
guage to be opaque and problematic in making meaning and saw literature
as being in society but as being able in an intricate process to translate itself
and its readers beyond ideology. Something Frye advocated for was the idea
that literature and literary criticism are autonomous. Even though both use
anthropology, psychology, history, philosophy, and other fields, they trans-
late them through the imagination. Frye, as I argued some while ago now,
used a theoretical imagination and was a theorist of the imagination (see
Hart 1994a).
Imagination –which was always important, as in Lucretius’ sense of the
sublime and Theseus’ description of the poet at Act V, scene v in A Midsum-
mer Night’s Dream– was a key to Romanticism. Frye, like William Blake
before him, saw the embodiment of the poetic and religious in the imagina-
tion (see Frye 1947). As a poet and critic or theorist, I find Frye’s emphasis on
metaphor and myth suggestive. These figures help to make the phrases and
structures of the texts we decide to call literary. Metaphor and narrative
(muthos or mythos, or story) are building blocks. During the time of student
unrest in the late 1960s, Frye once said that literary critics get their clues to
such a social situation of anxiety by examining “the emotional values attached
to metaphors” (Frye 1969: 45; see Hart 1994 ch. 6; Hart 1997). An imagina-
tive reconstruction of a world recreates the unity of subject and object.
Northrop Frye anchored his theory in metaphor, myth, and imagination.
These are the stuff of poetry. Theory and poetry meet in the imagination.
Frye’s preference for myth in the face of ideology has roots in his empha-
sis on the imagination. The classifications in Frye’s theory –which came from
his reading of William Blake, other literature, and the Bible– constituted a
grammar of the imagination. Frye’s notion of literature as a critique was a
counterpoise against a ubiquitous and inescapable ideology. A key illustrative
passage occurs within Words with Power: “As literature asserts nothing but
simply holds up symbols and illustrations, it calls for a suspension of judg-
ment, as well as varieties of reaction, that, left to itself, could be more corro-
sive of ideologies than any radical skepticism” (24). In this view, the putative
becomes a way to criticize the ways of life, and both involve a connection
between actual and possible worlds (see Hart 1988). In such a view, litera-
ture and its study become a critique rather than an embodiment of ideology,
which is a fractured term that can range from meaning false consciousness to
an all pervasive condition of human existence (see Plamenatz 15-31;
Kavanagh). Destutt de Tracy, a French philosopher of the late eighteenthRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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tradition (Williams 56, see Plamenatz 15). 
Various theorists used “ideology” as a charged term in the decades follow-
ing the Second World War. A few examples of such theorists should help to
clarify Frye’s views in context. Whereas Roland Barthes wrote about mythol-
ogy as ideology, and ideology was a term from the period from the end of the
1950s, especially for the generation of 1968, Frye attempted to use mythol-
ogy as a way of helping to restore the importance of poetry and poetics (see
Barthes 1957). Frye sought the restoration of the mythos of literature, what
might be said to be its very story or plot as opposed to content. Raymond
Williams saw three principal aspects of “ideology” in Marxism: a system of
beliefs of a class or group; a system of false ideas or consciousness in contrast
with true or scientific knowledge; the process of producing ideas and mean-
ings (Williams 55). So, as in Frye, in Marxist thought, ideology could mean
manufactured ideas against truth and knowledge. In both cases, there was a
mixture of ideology as negative and positive, something mixed with truth,
knowledge and the wisdom of stories. Terms often become stretched. In
1977, Williams was asking (55-71): will the terms “ideology” and “ideologi-
cal” do? Like Williams, Frye was dissatisfied with ideology as an all-inclusive
term. Whatever their differences, Frye and Williams realized that the lan-
guage complicates a theory of literature, and both these theorists resisted the
reduction of literature to content. Form and content, especially in literature,
created an imaginative interplay between text and context. As Frye and his
critics have suggested, there is a delicate balance between individual and col-
lective. Throughout Frye’s career, he wrote against tyranny at both extremes
of individualism and collectivism.4
2.2. Northrop Frye’s writing found its motive in metaphor (see Denham in
Frye 1990a: xiv). Frye examined the metaphors, myths, images, symbols,
genres and worlds found particularly in literature and has been concerned
with the transhistorical communication that literature makes possible. He
concentrated on the forms of writing or genres, the social function of litera-
ture, criticism and education, the way literature is made of literature, the
workings of mythology, the attempt to find unity and redeem the fall or
divided ground of language and literature and the power of the imagination.
After 1980, Frye was interested in discussing ideology, and he placed
mythology before ideology (Denham xvi-xvii; Frye 1990b, 1991, and Ham-
ilton). Where does fact end and interpretation begin and are not all conclu-
sions premises have been two persistent questions I asked as a student and
subsequently I reframed these in terms of what the relation is between storyRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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tinguish. Like Frye, I recognize the importance of the similarities and differ-
ences between them, but I also realize that these comparisons and distinc-
tions are more readily made in practice than proved in theory.
My own interest is in the distinction between history on the one hand
and literary and legal fictions on the other. What gives an historical interpre-
tation or legal fiction any more authority than a literary fiction like poetry
and the theatre? Historical poetry, drama and fiction also muddy the waters
of distinguishing between fact and fiction, event and interpretation, actual
and fictional (possible) world. For Frye, interpretation meant principally
reading or writing about the Bible and literature.
As the vast corpus of Frye’s work might extend this essay beyond its
bounds, I am concentrating most on his works as they relate to this specific
cluster of questions that centre on the relation between mythology and ideol-
ogy. He discussed mythology in the context of literary criticism, so that
“myth” means mythos, story, plot, narrative (Frye 1990a: 3). Frye said that
myth and metaphor are inseparable because myth annihilates the space
between A and B in time and metaphor does the same in space. Both myth
and metaphor are counterlogical (7-8). “The Koine of Myth,” has much to
do with the relation of story to history. Poetry keeps alive, in Frye’s view, the
metaphorical habit of mind, and gods are metaphors. Language and meta-
phor were at the heart of Frye’s mythological universe.
Text and context are in tension in the life and writing. Writers are torn
between their vision and society’s demands and can suffer persecution and
death for ideological reasons. Frye was not naive about the power of ideology
but he refused to celebrate it. He was wary of ideological hardliners, whether
religious, economic or political (20). What has priority was more important
to Frye. He reiterated his myths of concern, which are the ground for life.
For Frye, primary concern is the primitive view that life is better than death,
freedom better than bondage, happiness better than misery, and secondary
concern is ideology, or loyalty to one’s place in religion, society, politics and
class structure. The challenge lies in Frye’s view that ideology has always had
more power and prestige than primary concerns have. The revolution Frye
proposed, like the one Einstein mentioned with the advent of nuclear power,
is a matter of new thinking for survival. According to Frye, if we wish to sur-
vive, we must now choose, for the first time in history, primary over second-
ary concerns. Ideology is a key to poetry but can be evaded because whereas
history and culture condition poets, their poetry eludes being only ideologi-
cal (21). At the centre of this debate is language. Frye wondered whether lan-
guage uses humanity or humanity language (22). Part of this response to ide-RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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proposal represented an attempt to use the criticism of literature as “a rem-
edy for the abuses of ideology” even though past attempts have not been suc-
cessful (24). Counter-movements of myth and metaphor into “a world of
recovered identity” were part of Frye’s proposed bulwark against ideology.
This countervailing would work against the annihilations of time and the
alienations of space, where, for a moment, a sense of reality replaces our
usual fear of the unknown (26-27). Criticism is an opening up of possibili-
ties. Frye argued that in the full critical operation, there must be a catharsis
of belief, which belongs to ideology. Criticism should, however, open up to
us more intense paradoxes and self-contradictions, allowing for a greater
awareness of ourselves and of something not ourselves. Recognition, as Aris-
totle knew, was a key to the interpretation of poetry (see Hart 2006, esp. 1-
72). At this moment in Frye, we find, as I said a long time ago now, the par-
adoxical recognition of paradoxes of recognition, of a brief but necessary
renewal (see Hart 1992a).
Myth is built on metaphor, and symbols relate closely to metaphors. Frye
elaborated on symbol as a medium of exchange. It was as a token or counter
with a double nature, but also something completed by its context and its
relation to something outside of words (1990a: 28, 32). Frye noted that,
since Aristotle, critics have often seen the distinguishing mark of the poet as
the ability to think metaphorically (34). For Frye, poetry speaks the language
of unconscious and conscious, of emotion and intelligence. Mythos is built
on metaphor, which is the heart of poetry. In Frye’s theoretical world, a very
conscious verbal construct, like a metaphysical system, is founded on less
conscious metaphorical constructs. In Frye’s literary realm, criticism must
recognize the creativity of metaphor in poetic language and that only
another metaphor can describe a metaphor (36-37). Metaphor is inescap-
able. What is at stake is the motive of metaphor and thus of myth. Stories are
myths. Frye’s interest in narrative and conceptual and theoretical discourses
relates to his interest in “concern.” By this, he meant a conscious awareness
because societies attempt to come to terms with life through theory and sto-
ries. In Frye’s schema, there were traditionally two types of stories –the
sacred and the secular. The sacred has its own power of words. The Bible is a
mythology of concern for Western Europe and its former colonies in the
New World (44). Frye also understood the importance of the secular: he was
interested in the appearance and reality of social and literary conventions.
Like other important types of verbal expression, literature has authority. It is
not, in Frye’s view, ancillary (70). There need not be any apologies for poetry
as a weak and dependent form of language. To study literature and the arts isRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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fascinated with these apocalyptic glimpses into the imaginative world (78).
Metaphor absorbs the world and universe in its own myth.
The metaphorical human subsumes all nature in a kind of identification.
In Frye’s view, convention, genre and metaphor are related through identity.
There is, for Frye, no unmediated vision, but the poet’s quest for it is a quest
for the recovery of myth primarily through the identity in metaphor and
metaphorical structures between the natural and the human (86, 88, 90).
Frye outlined the interaction between mythology and ideology in the liter-
ary. He maintained that literature always reflects ideology in its content but
that its shape, as defined by convention and genre, looks back to mythologi-
cal time (89). Ideology, according to Frye, is metonymic because it is used as
a substitute structure of authority for an ideal one (90). For him, criticism is
the theory of the language of myth and metaphor and can study the assump-
tions on which ideology is based and the mythological structures that litera-
ture recreates directly. Ideology, as Frye saw it, is the framework that sur-
rounds us daily in its many forms (91). Communication is as important for
the sacred as it is for the secular. Frye concerned himself with the metaphori-
cal power of the Bible, which is the mythological basis for Western literature.
2.3. The reader of the Bible and of literature experience imagination and
identity. Frye maintained that, through a study of language, boundaries dis-
solve. The division between creators and critics falls away because criticism is
recreation (Frye 1990a: 108). Frye stressed the ecstatic metaphor, the sense
of identity between an individual’s consciousness and something in nature
(111-12). Nevertheless, literature is also hypothetical and displays ironic
detachment from all statements of assertion. It is a kind of model-thinking,
“an infinite set of possibilities of experience to expand and intensify our
actual experience” (114). This theory has something akin to possible world
and fictional world theories.
Metaphor and myth in the Bible and literature have their differences. The
possible and the actual, the diachronic and the synchronic occur in tension
in sacred and secular texts. The Bible is metaphorical, but, unlike literature,
is not content with ironic removal from assertion or experience. This dissim-
ilarity led Frye, after the Anatomy of Criticism, to examine the cultural con-
text of metaphor (114). The vanishing act of temporality makes it difficult
to glean something clear from it. In time there is ideology. Frye saw meta-
phorical and mythological recreation as a way of seeing what is beneath ide-
ology, what conditions us, and what social function we actually fill. There is
a construction of reality written with the craft of the imagination.RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
HART. MYTHOLOGY, VALUE-JUDGEMENTS AND IDEOLOGY 45The theoretical imagination is central to Frye’s vision of literature and
criticism (see Hart 1994a). The critic needs imagination but also has to
engage the world. Frye concerned himself with the responsibilities and
importance of the critic. “Vision” was also a recurrent theme in Frye’s cor-
pus. This term involves theoria, human vision and thought, and praxis,
human actions. Theory and practice were closely related in Frye’s view of the
close but distinct relation between literature and criticism.
One of the contexts for literature is the religious ground of the society in
which it finds itself. Frye’s exploration of religion involved language, mean-
ing, literature and history. Imagination brings these subjects together. In The
Modern Century (1967), Frye was working out his idea of myths of concern
(Frye 1990a: 105-06, see Frye 1967 and Denham 1978). At times, it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between mythology as Roland Barthes and Frye set out in
the 1950s and 1960s with ideology as it is later discussed from the 1960s
onward. Northrop Frye responded, as A. C. Hamilton has argued, to the
mythopoeic literature of the modern age and the need to make sense of the
chaotic critical scene in the central decades of this century (Hamilton, x).
Hamilton said that each of Frye’s works after Anatomy represents a brief ver-
sion of it, and each article an even briefer version (xi). Frye’s view of litera-
ture is that it is a human apocalypse, a kind of inter-human revelation. The
mythological and ideological are interdependent. Creation and recreation
connect writing, reading and criticism/ theory.
For Frye, however, the religious and spiritual impulses connected his life-
long interest in religion and literature. The Bible was a subject that inter-
ested Frye throughout his life. It provided a subject for his last major project,
consisting of three books published between 1982 and 1991: The Great
Code, Words with Power, and The Double Vision. Frye said that many con-
temporary critics and theorists were talking about the Bible even when
avoiding it: “many critical theories are obscurely motivated by a God-is-dead
syndrome that also arose from biblical criticism” (Frye 1990a: 229). Frye saw
the literal meaning of the Bible as being mythical and metaphorical (232).
He argued that questions of biblical criticism served as models for numerous
critical questions about secular literature. Moreover, he maintained that we
find that the otherness is the text itself (233). The Bible ends with a vision at
the end of time and history and its reality begins in the reader’s mind after
reading. The Bible is not historical but mythical because myth is the only
way to revelation (240). Frye’s interest in metaphor and its relation to
mythology is key to an understanding of his criticism and theory. The lan-
guage of myth and metaphor is self-contained. Anagnorisis is once more
important for Frye. In his view, secular and criticism rely on the recreation ofRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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in the Bible he stated in words that echo Anatomy: it is a vision of a present
that makes the new by reshaping the old (269).
Just as The Educated Imagination and The Modern Century distilled the
core of Frye’s views on literature, The Double Vision did so with the religious
dimension of his thought (see Frye 1963, 1967, 1991, see Frye 1971). As
George Steiner noted in 1974, in the preceding 150 years, the political and
philosophical history of the West involved a number of attempts “to fill the
central emptiness left by the erosion of theology” (Steiner 1974: 2). The same
could be said for poetry as in Matthew Arnold’s attempt to fill that void with
poetry and the study of poetry. Frye sought to bring religion and literature
together in a study of language. In The Double Vision, Frye returned to his
myths of concern. Human beings have primary and secondary concerns. The
primary, as we have seen, are food, sex, property, and freedom of movement
–the concerns we share with animals on a physical level. The secondary con-
cerns include our religious, political and other ideological loyalties.
Although Frye did not discount “ideology,” which for many traditional-
ists and liberals is a menacing word to be repressed or dismissed because it
threatens traditional values or freedom respectively, he chose “mythology” as
a term that is primary to the ideological. Frye was the master of reiteration
and so repeated this familiar idea repeatedly: “All through history ideological
concerns have taken precedence over primary ones” (Frye 1991: 6). Never
one to shy away from contradiction, paradox and ambivalence, which have
been key terms in literary studies for the past century, Frye stated the human
predicament: “We want to live and love, but we go to war; we want freedom,
but depend on the exploiting of other peoples, of the natural environment,
even of ourselves” (6). This assessment of our putting ideology first accu-
rately describes one of the main reasons why we choose not to feed, clothe,
shelter and educate all human beings.
One of the key distinctions for Frye, as we have noted, was that between
the spiritual element of primary concerns and the ideological concerns.
Repeatedly, Frye was concerned about tyranny, which comes from within,
and asserts that humans are products of nature and of social and ideological
conditioning (13). Spirituality, for him, might be a way of completing the
person and of undoing alienation. Frye appealed to the New Testament,
which represents the human being emerging from the natural and social into
the full worlds of the individual, which is a kind of resurrection or rebirth.
Recapping his views over the years, Frye said that the organizing principles
of literature are myth (story or narrative) and metaphor (figured language).
This world Frye calls “completely liberal” because of the freedom of spiritualRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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rates our ideological concerns, it devotes itself mainly to primary ones. Liter-
ature “does everything for people except transform them. It creates a world
that the spirit can live in, but it does not make us spiritual beings” (16). Liter-
ature is a means, an enabler, an open possibility for spirituality, but it cannot
create that. Frye’s last words in the last posthumous book that he had
intended for publication are an exhortation to vision. They are an apocalyptic
hermeneutic. This double vision based on uniqueness and unity. In the years
since Frye came to this conclusion and since his death, his words on inflexible
zeal are chilling. Frye’s double vision involves a moving away from literal
domination where zealots call on words to back up a totalitarian and ruthless
God. This zealousness has haunted and continues to haunt our world. There
is also a movement away from the literal disintegration of exegetes breaking
up texts. This double vision is a counterpoise to parodic literalism. It occurs
where the Logos unites mind and nature and where the spiritual and physical
worlds are simultaneously present. It is, according to Frye, where each
moment we live though and die out of into another order, where we live in
the resurrection here and now (83-85). This is the eternal now that Frye’s
work led up to, from Blake to the Bible. Behind Frye’s work is Blake’s human
form divine, the Christ in us all, here and now, witnessed through the vision-
ary company we are all apart of. In this culmination, Frye combined his pas-
sion for the divine and human comedy with that for the typological vision of
the spiritual and physical world. Metaphor and myth are an embodiment of
the apocalypse of a theoretical imagination that arises from the literary imagi-
nation and compliments it while it distinguishes itself from it.
2.4. Frye preferred the word “myth” to “ideology.” He saw the ideological as
a threat to literature and criticism and bristled at the subordination of the lit-
erary to the political (Frye 1957: 119). The identity of metaphor and the
displacement of metonymy –from Roman Jacobson onwards– raises the
question of the nature of argument and writing. Story or muthos and argu-
ment or the instrument of ideas may have distinct qualities but they can also
mix. In my own writing, I have suggested the name “story-argument” for
criticism motivated by narrative techniques (Hart 1991).
Sometimes it seems that which came first the story or the argument,
mythology or argument is difficult to say. Did the instruments of directions,
plans for food, shelter and survival come before the need for stories? The
relation between mythology and ideology is a troubled one. The mythology I
have proposed in my own work is not the return to purity or the fear of the
stranger but rather that speech and writing that have the power of opennessRILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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thought. Perhaps poetry is, through the metaphorical urge, a recreation of
the animistic impulse. It is possible that this unity, of humans as being at one
with nature, is fallen from the start, but poetry, at least in its pastoral and
comic forms, recreates moments of harmony and unity. It is possible that
poetry makes the world alive again even if the reader resists this union of
subject and object or leaves it for the fallen world of split subjects when the
poem is over. Poetry is mythological because of the what if of story that is
not part of history. Historical poems and fiction blur the distinction and
suggest how knotted the possibility of poetry or literature is tied up with the
actuality of history. Here, mythology and ideology are especially bound
together. Poetry is a matter of craft as well as imagination: the classical and
romantic meet in our modern construals of the poetic and of criticism or
theory of poetry or literature. In speaking about craft, the poet or poietes, is
the maker of created things, or poiema, who shows skill and art, or tekhne, in
this making. Representation complicates this matter further. Theoria is a
contemplation. It is a speculation that can be a representation, thought as a
mirror for the world, or an idea apart from it. A theorem, however, is a prop-
osition that needs to be proved or an idea that has been proven or is thought
to be true. And theorein means to observe. The relation between making and
theory, poetry and philosophy is difficult and can be oppositional, in partic-
ular in relation to ideology. The discussion of poets in Plato’s Republic illus-
trates this point, as poets are supposed to support the state or go into exile.
Mythology is expressed through the imaginative and hypothetical nature
of literature: it is of its time but communicates across time. Poetry is mythol-
ogy translated in literature and explained to the culture in criticism or theory
in such a way as to have a double movement. This doubleness seems to
embody and resist the power of dominant ideologies and the political pres-
sures brought to bear on writers, scholars, and critics. Perhaps, as I have said
elsewhere, myth might be a hope against the desolate record of human his-
tory and against tyranny. Northrop Frye, as we have observed, considered
myth in literature as the rising up of the proletariat into a classless society
and the return of the repressed. We also saw that Frye returned to Marx and
Freud, as well as to William Blake and others, to help create his vision of
hope and regeneration. The social function of literature, according to Frye,
was to create a human community that cares for the basic needs of its mem-
bers. In part, Frye’s theory, although also something different, was a later and
important contribution in the tradition of defences of poetry in English that
Sidney and Shelley are perhaps most representative.RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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to texts inform literary studies, which has its roots in editing, biblical herme-
neutics, rhetoric, and philology. Poetry, the centre of those studies, grows out
of the aristocratic ideals of classical literature. What is important is to speak
against prevailing opinion and even to engage with even doxa or anti-doxa
that has become doxa while paying attention to changes in historical con-
texts. What is also called the doxy is not something effectively tested or
proved but a set of ideological attitudes. It derives from the Greek meaning
opinion and originally pertained to religious or theological matters but now
more generally to the cultural, political and social. The poetics suggests as a
countervailing matter indeterminacy, gnomic utterance, qualities of parable,
so that ideology can briefly be understood, evaded or escaped. Poetry can be
a critique of critique as well as of life. It is important to distinguish the
parodic and ideological use of myth from this putative and recreative kind.
There is something possible, fictional, and putative about the poetic, but it
can be as political.
Humans interpret. We make stories, theories, arguments, and then inter-
pret those. Culture is lived interpretation. People and peoples participate in an
interpretation of interpretation. A persistent and vexed question is where does
fact end and interpretation begins. Seeing is not so straightforward. Some-
times it appears to be vision and wisdom coming together and sometimes it is
seeming and full of error. Perhaps seeing is a constant adjustment of both these
attitudes together. The recognition of recognition is that the way of seeing in
literature or the humanities, although cognate with observation and discovery
in science, is not identical to it. The problem of mimesis is inextricably bound
up with interpretation and recognition. Plato, as Cornford notes, extended
mimesis to something akin to what we mean by “representation” in English.
Plato also used mimetes as we would artist, and considered the work of art is a
likeness or image (eikon) of the original, holding up a mirror up to nature (see
Cornford 323-4, see xxvii-xxix). Northrop Frye differed from the Platonic
Socrates, who argued that knowledge cannot be gained by studying the poet’s
picture in words or representation of life, including his portraits of heroic
characters. Socrates took this view because he thought that poets do not work
with a conscious intelligence but from inspiration. Socrates said that poets
used a beautiful language without understanding its meaning, so that they
could not instruct us through descriptions of chariots or of war. Without mak-
ing leading critical theorists of the post-war of a piece, I would say that
Northrop Frye’s double vision, Roland Barthes’s double sign, and Derrida’s
double writing might well differ on the notion of the integration and disinte-RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
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interpretation concern them all (see Hart 2006).
Experience and reading, the concrete and the abstract, all bear on how we
see and what insights, small and large, we have. Eric Auerbach, Northrop
Frye, and Terence Cave concentrated on recognition in literature, but texts
beyond the literary have moments of recognition (see Auerbach). Carlo
Ginzburg, a historian, expressed his work in terms of recognition and discov-
ery (Ginzburg 1989: xii). Images, tropes and metaphors even affect those
who write about history, that is about events and the story of those events.
Students might also have recognitions about their teachers as well as their
teachings and the subject they teach. Northrop Frye was one of my teachers
and a teacher to many and one who produced many teaching books (as he
referred to them). His views on poetics, language and secular and sacred texts
in the Bible and literature and their social context have influenced me and
many others, even those who deny or repudiate that possibility. The opening
up that Frye saw in a creative and recreative present that engages with the
past and future in the difficult circumstances of temporality is still sugges-
tive. The communication between writer and reader is an imaginative act in
theory and practice.
Notes
1. In this essay I am trying to concentrate more on Anatomy of Criticism than I did in
my earlier work on mythology and ideology, such as my paper at the conference,
“The Legacy of Northrop Frye,” Victoria College, Toronto, 29-31 October 1992, or
in chapter 7 of my book, Northrop Frye: The Theoretical Imagination, which was fin-
ished and ready to go at Routledge in 1992 but which was published in 1994, or my
article on the ends on ideology, published in Comparative Literature in 1995.
Although I draw on my other essays on Frye and writing, education, fiction, anat-
omy, myth and metaphor, I am interested in new patterns and contexts for this mate-
rial (see Hart 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2006). One
reason I refer to much but not all my writing on Frye is to avoid too much repetition
and to allow readers to see, if they so choose, how I have developed this and related
topics elsewhere.
2. On the creation and reception of Anatomy, see Ayre, 256-67, and for an engaging
conversation about the book between Northrop Frye and David Cayley, see Cayley
68-88.
3. On ideology, see Adams, Decker, Eagleton 2007, Ewick, Good, Hawkes, Inglis,
McGann and Privateer; on mythology, see Casapo, Leeming, Leonard and McClure,
and Mali. On writing and difference, see Derrida.RILCE 25.1 (2009) 29-54
HART. MYTHOLOGY, VALUE-JUDGEMENTS AND IDEOLOGY 514. During the 1970s and the 1980s, many literary theorists took a turn away from the
mythological and the putative space of the literary imagination. Catherine Belsey
preferred dialectical materialism to Frye’s classless society in the imagination (Belsey
28; Frye 1957: 347-48). Belsey wanted human action in society and thinks that crit-
icism cannot be detached from society and has ideological and social implications
(29). In Northrop Frye’s work, Terry Eagleton found an emphasis on the utopian
root of literature that results from “a deep fear of the actual social world, a distaste for
history itself ” (1983: 93). In Anatomy, Frye claimed to be engaged in historical criti-
cism in the face of other forms of criticism that were claiming to be historical with-
out being so. Eagleton considered Frye, like Matthew Arnold, to be a liberal
humanist whose free, classless and urbane society was a universalizing of liberal mid-
dle class values. Maggie Humm was sometimes critical of feminist and patriarchal
myth criticism: “But if feminist critics overemphasise the Utopian root of literature,
often male critic –like Frye and McLuhan– use myth as a displaced version of reli-
gion to avoid socially realisable goals” (100). Responding to Humm, Janet Todd
noted that the mythological excitement that occurred in feminism during the mid-
1970s showed some dependence on male myth criticism in vogue in the 1950s and
1960s, especially after Frye’s Anatomy, but the feminist mythology had its own motifs
and messages (Todd 30). Has the late Frye elaborated a position on ideology beyond
that in the Anatomy, which Belsey and others have examined because of the fame and
centrality of the book to criticism in English?
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